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ABSTRACT
Unionism in the United States is contagious; it spills out of coal mines and steel mills into other
establishments in the neighborhood, like hospitals and supermarkets. The geographic spillover
of unionism is documented here using a newly constructed establishment level data on unionism
that is rich in geographic detail. A strong connection is found between unionism of health care
establishments today and proximity to unionized coal mines and steel mills from the 1950s.
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not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Unionization rates vary substantially across states in the United States. In South Carolina,
only 5 percent of workers are covered by union contracts while in West Virginia, 16 percent
are covered and in Pennsylvania, 18 percent. One factor underlying these diﬀerences is
industry composition. The heavily unionized mining and steel industries are nonexistent in
South Carolina but are major parts of the economies of West Virginia and Pennsylvania. But
diﬀerences in industry composition are not the whole story. Even within the same industries,
unionization rates are lower in South Carolina. In Pennsylvania and West Virginia it is easy
to ﬁnd unionized supermarkets and hospitals as well as mines and steel mills. These are
virtually nonexistent in South Carolina.
The thesis of this study is that hospitals and supermarkets are unionized in Pennsyl-
vania and West Virginia because unionism in coal mines and steel mills spilled over into other
establishments in the area. More generally, the thesis is that unionism is contagious at the
geographic level.
In recent years, there has been much discussion in the economics literature about social
interactions of all kinds, including peer group eﬀects in the classroom, knowledge spillovers
across ﬁrms, and network eﬀects in technology adoption.1 Geographic spillover of unionism
is a type of social interaction. In the prototypical model of this literature, a decision-making
agent is more likely to select a particular option if other agents also choose it because of
positive spillover beneﬁts. The identiﬁcation problem that pervades this literature is distin-
guishing the existence of spillovers from other explanations for parallel behavior. Individuals
who are near each other often share characteristics that lead them to make similar choices.
For example, if we see a neighborhood where every household owns a luxury automobile
like a Mercedes-Benz or Lexus, this is probably more an indication of the aﬄuence of the
neighborhood than a result of spillovers in car purchase decisions.
This same identiﬁcation issue comes up when analyzing spillovers of unionism. Union-
ization rates tend to be low in the South. Historically, the South has had little employment
in union-prone industries like steel and automobiles. Hence, the absence of spillovers from
such industries may well be why hospitals and supermarkets are nonunion in the South. But
southern states share three other characteristics that also might matter. First, the South
has had a substantially diﬀerent racial history than the North. It is widely believed that
management in the South used race to break unions, playing poor whites oﬀ against blacks.
Diﬀe r e n c e si nu n i o n i z a t i o nr a t e sb e t w e e nt h eN o r t ha n dt h eS o u t ht o d a ym a yr e ﬂect this
diﬀerent history of race relations.2 Second, early in the 20th century, the South was quite
poor compared to the North. To attract industry, the southern states pursued various anti-
1See, for example, Manski (1993); Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996); Brock and Durlauf (2001);
and Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004).
2See Marshall (1967) for a history of unionism in the South and a discussion of the role of race.union policies, such as right-to-work laws, that contributed to keeping unionization rates low
(Cobb 1993, Holmes 1998). Third, the South received fewer immigrants than the North. Such
immigrants, like those from Finland, often brought with them what were considered radical
ideas about socialism, and these ethnic diﬀerences in attitudes towards unions contributed
to diﬀerences in unionism between the North and the South.
In addition to dealing with these confounding factors, any analysis of how the location
of industries aﬀects unionism must confront the fact that eﬀects can go the other way. The
extent of unionism at a location may inﬂuence which industries locate there. Industries that
are prone to unions might avoid areas where unionism is strong. In the 1960s and 1970s, for
example, the domestic automakers General Motors and Ford pursued a southern strategy of
locating plants in the South with the speciﬁc intent of running nonunion operations. The
United Auto Workers fought back hard and eventually organized all the southern plants of
GM and Ford. Because of the selection of where such plants might locate, in the data we
might not see a positive connection between the location of such industries and the extent of
unionism in other industries, even if positive spillovers exist.
To address these issues, I undertake the following analysis. First, to circumvent en-
dogeneity issues regarding the location of industry, I determine spillovers coming from coal
mines, metal mines, and steel mills in the 1950s. The primary determinant of the location of
mines is nature. Moreover, in the time period I consider, virtually all coal and metal mines
were unionized regardless of location, so union avoidance is likely not to have been a primary
location factor. Though less so than mines, the location of steel mills is heavily determined
by natural factors such as access to raw materials. And like mines, steel mills were unionized
virtually everywhere in the 1950s, including in the South.
Second, to control for the fact that the South is regarded as diﬀerent in many ways
from the North, I focus the analysis on the South in isolation. Thus my results are coming
from variation within the South, rather than a comparison of the North and South. The
question of the paper can then be posed as follows: Though there weren’t many such places,
selected areas of the South did have mining and metal. Is there evidence of union spillovers
in those places? While the main focus of the paper is the South, I obtain similar results for
other regions of the country.
Third, to control for confounding factors that might vary across states, even within
the South, my analysis compares locations within the same state. This ﬁxed-eﬀects approach
holds constant state-level anti-union policies and any state-level diﬀerences in things like
race. Undertaking such an analysis requires data on unionism at a ﬁne level of geographic
and industry detail. Since such data are not available from standard sources, a substantial
undertaking was required to collect the data.
Fourth, to make within industry, within state comparisons as clean as possible, I focus
2on nontraded industries. This focus ensures that industries are diﬀuse enough throughout
each state to make comparisons possible (since every location has hospitals and grocery
stores). Also, the basic technology for nontraded goods like health care facilities and su-
permarkets tends to be similar across locations. For traded goods, technologies more likely
diﬀer, as locations specialize according to comparative advantage.
I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant connection between the probability that a nontraded good estab-
lishment is unionized today and proximity to mining and metal establishments from the
1950s. While overall in the South there was little of this activity, there were pockets in the
South with substantial amounts of such activity. In particular, Birmingham, Alabama, was
a major steel and coal center. And in Birmingham, one ﬁnds unionized nursing homes and
supermarkets, unlike most other places in the South where these are unheard of.
I. Background
This section provides some background information that is needed before getting started.
It begins by discussing unionism in U.S. coal mines and steel mills circa 1950. It then
discusses the possible channels through which this unionism might have spilled over into
other industries.
The strength of unions varies over time and across industries. The sources of variation
over time are many, but of particular importance are variations over time in the legal environ-
ment. It is widely recognized that the labor environment in the late 1930s was very positive
to unions and contributed to high unionization rates at mid-century. (See Freeman 1998.)
In contrast, the legal environment is regarded as less friendly to labor now, in addition to
other time trends working against labor (Neumann and Rissman 1984, Farber and Western
2000). The strength of unions varies across industries for various reasons, but certainly one
of them is diﬀerences in capital intensity and sunk costs. Mining and steel production are
capital-intensive industries with high sunk costs and are, hence, highly vulnerable to union-
ization. These industries also have other characteristics, e.g., working conditions, that make
them prone to unionization.
Given the favorable legal environment and favorable industry conditions, at mid-
century virtually all of the coal mines and steel mills were unionized throughout the country.
In 1958, 95 percent of employment in the primary metals (two-digit SIC) industry in the
South was in establishments with a majority of workers under a union agreement (Douty
1960). Regarding mines, the labor economist H. G. Lewis (1963, p. 74) wrote, “In 1934 the
United Mine Workers, with the assistance of the National Industrial Recovery Act, succeeded
in organizing almost all of the bituminous coal mining industry, and from that time to the
3present the extent of unionism in the industry has been close to 100 percent.”3 That was
written in 1963. Today, although unions continue to be strong in these industries, unions no
longer have them locked up. The 1980s saw entry of nonunion minimills in the steel industry.
Given the strength of unions in mines and mills in the earlier time period, I will focus on the
industries in that time period as a source of a spillover.
W h i l et h e r ei sl i t t l ei nt h ew a yo fa c a d e m i cr e s e a r c ht h a tq u a n t i ﬁes spillovers of union-
ism, parties involved in labor relations believe spillovers matter.4 Union oﬃcials believe that
if they successfully organize one plant in an area, it will be easier to organize a neighboring
plant. To take an example, the United Auto Workers has been trying very hard to organize
the Mercedes Plant in Vance, Alabama. According to industry observers, “Vance represents
what could be the ﬁrst domino in a row of non-union transplant facilities for the UAW.
...I f V a n c e i s o r g a n i z e d , H o n d a ’ s f o r t h c o m i n g p l a n t i n A l a b a m a c o u l d b e v u l n e r a b l e . ” 5
This view is held by management as well. The Chamber of Commerce of Virginia (a state
where unionization is low) oﬀers seminars on “Protecting Our Positive Labor Climate” and
publishes annually the details of all the (relatively few) unionization attempts in the state.6
The Chamber’s approach of promoting vigilance and mapping union outbreaks is analogous
to the way the Centers for Disease Control might approach an infectious disease.
What is the transmission mechanism through which unionism in one establishment
spills over into another establishment? There are several possibilities.
Unionism can be transmitted from a coal mine to a grocery store when an individual
with experience working as a unionized coal miner either changes jobs and works in retail or
has children who work in retail. As discussed by Freeman and Medoﬀ (1984), union members
tend to have more positive views towards unions than nonmembers do. It is plausible that
workers retain these positive attitudes towards unions when they switch jobs. There is a
large literature in psychology and organizational behavior that emphasizes the importance
of workers’ prior attitudes in determining union organization success. These are formed in
a process of socialization and aﬀect the union commitment of a worker. (See, for example,
Fullagar et al. 1995 and Hester and Fuller, 2001.) There is evidence that positive attitudes
towards unions can be transmitted through the family. Deshpande and Fiorito (1989) report
that individuals who have family members in a union are more likely to have positive views
3Additional evidence on industry shares is presented in Freeman and Medoﬀ (1979). Table 1 of that
study reports estimates of production worker covered by union contracts by industry. For anthracite and
bituminous coal mining, the percentages were 100 and 89 percent. For iron ores and copper ores, the
percentages were 100 percent. For blast furnace and basic steel products, the percentage was 98 percent.
4There is some related academic research. Kremer and Olken (2001) present a model of evolutionary
competition of unions. Geographers are interested in the geography of unionism, e.g., Herod (1998), but
don’t frame the question the way I do here.
5See “UAW Looks for Membership AdVANCEment,” Ward’s Auto World, July 1999.
6See http://www.vachamber.com/pubs/labor_info.htm.
4towards unions.
This discussion of attitudes can be given an economic interpretation. It is plausible
that workers who have never worked in a unionized facility and who don’t know many union
members are uncertain about the beneﬁts of unions. Unions may be an experience good that
one can learn about either through direct contact or that of family and friends. With risk
aversion, following the logic of Erdem and Keane (1996), we can expect the market share of
a product–in this case, union representation–to be higher, the greater the experience with
the product.
The above discussion emphasizes the personal connection of a worker with unionism
though either his or her own experience or the experience of a family member. But even
if none of the workers in a particular establishment has a personal connection to unionism,
the workers will beneﬁt more from a union if other people outside the establishment in the
surrounding area have such a connection. The ability to strike is a crucial component of union
success. For a strike to be successful, it is important that replacement workers and customers
not cross picket lines. These lines are less likely to be breached in an area where a large
fraction of population either works in coal mines or steel mills or has close family members
who do. For example, Marshall (1967, p. 177) discusses how a strike in 1937 to obtain a
union contract at a garment factory in Tennessee was successful because of the support of
the large number of members of the United Mine Workers in the area. Marshall also noted
that, “The workers in the garment plants were mostly women from the miners’ families.”
Another channel for spillovers besides attitudes has to do with union infrastructure and
staﬀ. Locations with many unionized mills and coal mines tend to be the homes of numerous
professional union staﬀ people with training in organizing and other specialized skills related
to unionism. In addition to tending to their responsibilities for existing unionized plants,
these staﬀ members are on the lookout for new opportunities, and these opportunities can
cross industry boundaries. As will be shown later, at locations where the steel industry is
concentrated, it is not uncommon for nursing homes and hospitals to be organized by the
United Steelworkers of America (USWA) union. Of course, this spillover of union organizing
staﬀ need not occur through the same union, since individuals with specialized skills can
switch aﬃliations. This is illustrated by the case of one Jon Hitchings from Pennsylvania.
According to his union, “He had formerly worked for the United Mine Workers working
underground for 22 years. He had been the President of the local mine committee and has a
good background for protecting workers’ rights.”7 This individual is now on the staﬀ of the
Services Workers union, representing social workers.
7See the minutes from a meeting of Chapter 5 of Local 668 of the Service Employees In-
ternational Union (SEIU) from October 10, 2002, posted at http://seiu668.localsonline.org/ourlocal/
chapter5minutes10102002.cfm.
5II. The Data
The ﬁrst part of this section uses the standard data source on unions to describe regional and
state-level diﬀerences in unionization rates. The standard source is not geographically precise
enough for my purposes, however. Therefore, the second part of the section describes the
two alternative data sets that I have constructed in order to provide the needed geographic
detail.
A. From the Standard Source: Regional and State Diﬀerences in Unionism
The standard source about unionization in the United States is the Current Population Survey
(CPS) pro‘duced jointly by the U.S. Bureaus of Labor Statistics and the Census. This is a
monthly survey of individuals that asks them whether or not they are union members or
covered by union contracts. The top section of Table 1 reports the percentage of workers who
have responded that they are covered by a union contract, by region, for selected industries
in a recent period. I take an average over three years of data, 1999 through 2001, rather than
use only one year, since otherwise the sample size is too low for some of the industry/location
cells in the table.
The main focus of this paper is the South,h e r ed e ﬁned as the 11 states that joined
the Confederacy.8 For the sake of making some initial comparisons, I also include two other
regions in Table 1. The North is the region of 21 states bounded on the west by the indus-
trial states of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Missouri.9 This region is the traditional
industrial heartland of the United States and was once commonly called the “manufacturing
belt.” The Rest of U.S. is the remaining states, less Alaska and Hawaii (a total of 17).
The table also reports unionization rates for several selected states. North and South
Carolina from the South are selected because they are the least unionized states in the
country. As will be shown later, they also happen to have negligible mining and metal
sectors. Alabama, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania are selected because of their connections
to the coal mining and steel industries. These three states vary in their connection to the
south. Alabama is, of course, Deep South. Pennsylvania is unmistakably North. West
Virginia is classiﬁed as in the North because it wasn’t part of the Confederacy. But in other
respects it is like the South, and no one would confuse it with New York. West Virginia will
be left out of the baseline estimates for this paper which deﬁnes the South as just those states
in the Confederacy. But I emphasize that the case of West Virginia, with its relatively high
unionization rates in health care and groceries, provides strong prima facie evidence of my
8The South is Arkansas, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Texas, and Virginia.
9The North is Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri,
M i n n e s o t a ,M a i n e ,M a r y l a n d ,M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,M i c h i g a n, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, West Virginia, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
6thesis that unionism spills out of coal mines. And I get similar results if I were to include
West Virginia in the South.
Looking ﬁrst at all industries combined (the ﬁr s tr o w ) ,w es e et h a tt h eu n i o nc o v e r a g e
rate in the South is 7.7 percent, and this is substantially less than the 19.5 and 15.3 percent
rates in the North and the rest of the United States. The rates in the Carolinas are only
about 5 percent. Even though Alabama is in the Deep South, it has a unionization rate of
11.3 percent. West Virginia’s rate is higher still. Alabama and West Virginia have more
mining and metal activity than the Carolinas, and this industry composition contributes to
their higher unionization rates. But even within the same industries, Alabama and West
Virginia tend to have higher unionization rates than North and South Carolina.
To make comparisons within the same industry, I focus attention on nontraded in-
dustries with signiﬁcant unionization activity. By focusing on nontraded industries, I ensure
broad geographic coverage and, as discussed in the introduction, make it more likely that
the industries are similar across locations. To produce a list of industries, I took the 2000
CPS and selected industries in the construction, wholesale trade, retail trade, and service
sectors, because industries in these sectors are primarily not traded. I eliminated educational
services and government services in order to focus on the private sector. I selected only those
industries with a union coverage rate above 10 percent in 2000 and with at least 500,000
total employees in order to focus on industries with signiﬁcant union activity. I eliminated
miscellaneous industries or “those not elsewhere classiﬁed.” This selection process resulted in
six industries: construction, wholesale groceries, retail groceries, hotels and motels, nursing
homes, and hospitals.10
As is clear in Table 1, unionization rates within these industries are substantially
higher in the North than in the South. Within the South, unionization rates in Alabama
are higher than in North or South Carolina in the same industry. West Virginia’s rates are
higher still. The thesis of this study is that the relatively high unionization rates in Alabama
and West Virginia in nontraded industries are in part a consequence of union spillovers from
the mining and metal sectors in these states.
B. From Alternative Sources: Richer Geographic Detail . . .
The empirical analysis of this project requires data on unionization at a ﬁne level of geographic
detail. The CPS data are inadequate for this purpose. One problem is that the CPS is only
a tiny sample of the U.S. population, so sample sizes can be too small when we go to a high
level of geographic and industry detail. For example, in Table 1, I have observations on only
24 workers in the hotel industry in Alabama. Another problem is that for a large portion of
10The CPS treats all of construction as one industry; unionization rates at a ﬁner level of detail are not
available. Since unionization is heavy throughout all the industries in the construction sector, I take the
sector as a whole and treat it as an industry.
7the CPS sample, geographic location within the state is not disclosed. Location in the large
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) is disclosed, but location in the smallest MSAs and
rural counties is generally not disclosed. This is a particular problem for me because many
of the mining areas that I will be interested in are in rural counties.
My need for geographic data at a ﬁne level of detail leads me to construct two alter-
native data sets that use administrative data from federal agencies. The ﬁrst data set covers
nursing homes and hospitals. It is a very clean data set that has been put together in a
labor-intensive process. The second data set is cruder, but is broader in coverage, including
all six industries listed above. The results for hospitals and nursing homes are very similar
across the two data sets.
B.1. The FMCS/POS Data on Health Care Facilities
The starting point of the ﬁrst data set is a directory of the universe of nursing homes and
hospitals in existence in the United States in 1996. This data set is the “Provider of Services”
ﬁle (POS) for 1996 released by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. There are
15,014 nursing homes and 6,906 hospitals.11 The POS data include address information and
facility characteristics, like organizational form (nonproﬁt, for proﬁt, or government) and
number of beds.
In order to determine which of these facilities are unionized, I matched data on expiring
union contracts to establishments in the POS ﬁle. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service (FMCS) is the source of the contract expiration data. The National Labor Relations
Act requires that notice of contract expiration be ﬁl e dw i t ht h i sa g e n c y . T h i sn o t i c eg i v e s
the agency a heads up so that it can be ready if it has to mediate any strikes.
I matched 26,650 contracts in the FMCS data base from the period 1986—2003 to facil-
ities in the POS ﬁle. My matching algorithm used the company name, address information,
and phone information found in both ﬁles. The process required an extensive amount of man-
ual matches, and here Google proved invaluable. For example, by Googling a phone number
in the FMCS ﬁle, I could ﬁnd additional information about the entity from the FMCS ﬁle
that would enable me to complete the match in the POS ﬁle. The overwhelming majority
of contracts in the health care industry cover a bargaining unit at a single establishment.
There do exist multi-unit contracts, particularly in the New York area, where industry con-
sortia such as the League of Voluntary Hospitals negotiate industry-wide contracts covering
sometimes dozens of facilities. In such cases, I obtained additional information from the U.S.
Department of Labor, including the actual contracts themselves, to identify the establish-
ments covered by the contracts. I also used Web sites of union locals to verify matches. See
11I exclude Alaska and Hawaii here and throughout the rest of the study. The 15,014 ﬁgure includes only
nursing homes that are not part of hospitals.
8the data appendix for details about the data and summary statistics. All of the data for this
paper are posted on the Web, and the appendix provides the web address.
DiNardo and Lee (2004) have also recently used the FMCS contract data to study a
diﬀerent question. They use the data in a wholesale fashion, using the data from all industries,
trying to match up all of the contracts. My approach is less ambitious than theirs in terms of
industry coverage. But by focusing on only one industry, I am able to do things in terms of
matching by hand and bringing in other sources of information which would not be feasible
if one were to look at all industries together.
Id e ﬁne a health care facility as unionized if there was at least one bargaining unit
under contract in the facility over the period of the contract data, 1986—2003. There are
3,555 unionized facilities in the POS ﬁle, according to this deﬁnition. The median unionized
facility has 6 expiring contracts. The maximum number of contracts for any one facility is
50, and this is for Washington Hospital in San Francisco. A contract with a given bargaining
unit will appear multiple times in the data set as it expires and is renewed on a two- or
three-year cycle. In addition, many facilities have multiple bargaining units with a contract
for the registered nurses, a contract for food service workers, etc. Washington Hospital even
has a contract for the radiologists.
Establishment unionization rates, weighted by beds, are reported in the middle section
of Table 1. The table shows that 20.2 percent of all nursing home beds are in unionized
establishments. This is about twice as large a portion as the 10.8 percent of workers in the
industry that are covered by unions from the CPS. A diﬀerence of this order of magnitude
is to be expected since in any given unionized establishment, a sizable fraction of workers
would not be covered by a union contract.12
The patterns with the FMCS/POS data are qualitatively very similar to the patterns
found with the CPS. Unionization rates in the South overall are much lower than in the North
and the rest of the country. The rates in North and South Carolina are particularly low.
B.2. The NLRB/CBP Data on Union Elections
To construct the FMCS/POS data, I made use of the publicly available data on the uni-
verse of health care establishments. For the other four industries I am looking at, such as
retail groceries and construction, there are no analogous public data on the universe of estab-
lishments. Even if such data were available, say, for grocery stores, additional complications
would make it diﬃcult to link them to the FMCS. Nursing home and hospital union contracts
12For North Carolina, the establishment rate of 1.6 is actually smaller than the worker rate from the CPS
of 1.9. There are several potential explanations for this. First, the CPS estimate is based on a small sample,
so there can be sampling error. Second, the underlying population of establishments is somewhat broader
in the CPS sample than in the POS ﬁle that I use. See the data appendix for further discussion about the
set of establishments used in the POS ﬁle.
9usually cover a single establishment, and the speciﬁc address and name of the establishment
are provided in the FMCS ﬁle. In contrast, contracts in the retail grocery industry usually
cover multiple grocery stores in an area, the location information in the FMCS ﬁle is often
vague, like “Chicago area,” and the number of establishments covered is often unspeciﬁed.
In order to have something to say about these other industries, I turn to data on
certiﬁcation of representative (RC) elections supervised by the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB). By law, these elections take place at the establishment level. I have data on
all elections over the period 1980—1999, and for each election, the three-digit SIC code of the
establishment is provided as well as the county where it is located.
The NLRB election data measure a ﬂow while the FMCS contract data measure a
stock. If an industry were 100 percent union at a particular location and if there were no
entry and exit, then no elections would be observed there. The FMCS data on contracts
would pick up that this location is 100 percent union, but the NLRB data would ﬁnd no
indication of unionism. While this limitation of the NLRB data should be kept in mind, I
think the NLRB data are a useful proxy of the extent of unionism in a particular industry
and location. Even heavily unionized areas are rarely 100 percent union, so there is room for
a union to expand. State overall unionization rates from the CPS are highly correlated with
NLRB election rates (ρ =0 .83).13
My goal here is to evaluate the rate at which NLRB elections in an industry and
location occur relative to the number of establishments in this industry and location. The
U.S. Census Bureau’s data series County Business Patterns (CBP) provides establishment
counts by industry, county, and employment size category. I linked the 1980—1999 NLRB
election data to the 1992 CBP data, using the industry, county, and size information. In the
ﬁrst step of the matching process, I linked NLRB records of the same establishment, using
address and company name information. This is important since 37.5 percent of elections
are for establishments with multiple elections. I then matched the NLRB establishment-level
data to the CBP data, by three-digit SIC, county, and establishment size.14 One issue is that
there are establishments with elections before 1992 in the NLRB data that are shut down by
1992, so my process will match them to some other establishment that does exist in 1992.
This is not a serious problem because I am not actually using any information in the CBP
record that the NLRB record doesn’t already have. The purpose of the exercise is to create
a denominator for the probability of the event of an organizing election, to set up a pool of
potential election targets from which the given one was drawn. Since the CBP population
13The correlation is between state total unionization rates from the CPS for 1990 (Hirsch and MacPherson
2003, 2005) and NLRB RC elections 1980—1999 per 1990 CPS state employment, weighted by employment.
14The NLRB data set does not provide information about establishment size. But it does list the size of
the bargaining unit. I estimated establishment size in the NLRB data by setting it to twice bargaining unit
size.
10moves slowly over time, the underlying pool for 1980 is roughly similar to the pool for 1992.
Table 4 below reports establishment counts by industry for establishments in the CBP in the
South group of states. Further details about the data are provided in the appendix.
An establishment in the NLRB/CPB data is deﬁned as unionized if it has at least
one election over the period 1980—1999. Unionization rates, per 1,000 establishments, are
reported in the bottom section of Table 1. The nursing home and hospital industries have
relatively high rates overall, at 121 and 211 per 1,000 establishments. These rates are close in
magnitude to the rates in the FMCS/POS data (if we take into account that one is per 100,
the other per 1,000). The rates in the remaining four industries are relatively small. Unlike
the health care industry, most of the unionization of the grocery and construction industries
took place prior to 1980. Nonetheless, the qualitative patterns in the NLRB/CBP data set
are consistent with the patterns in the CPS data. For each industry, the unionization rates
in the South in the NLRB/CBP data are about half or smaller than the levels in the North,
just as occurs in the CPS. At the state data, compared with the Carolinas, unionization is
high in Alabama in nursing homes, groceries, and construction, in both the NLRB/CBP data
and the CPS data. The rates in West Virginia and Pennsylvania are higher still.
C ....A n dO t h e rV a r i a b l e s
As explained in the introduction, I focus on the mining and primary metals sectors from
the mid-20th century, the heyday of unionism, as a source of contagion, or spillover. I
use data from the 1958 Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1961a, b) to determine the
distribution of employment by county. The data published by the Census include cell counts
of establishments by employment size classiﬁcations, e.g., an employment range of 250—499
employees. I use these establishment-level size ranges to estimate employment. For mining,
I include metal mining (SIC 1000), anthracite coal mining (SIC 1100), and bituminous coal
mining (SIC 1200). Metal manufacturing is deﬁned here as primary metals manufacturing
(SIC 3300). See the data appendix for more details.
Table 2 reports employment shares in the mining and metal industries for 1958 (cal-
culated as a percentage of 1960 total employment) for the nation as a whole and for selected
regions and states. Observe that in 1960, the employment share in these sectors was three
times higher in the North than in the South. These industries were essentially nonexistent
in North and South Carolina. Note, however, that the industries were well-represented in
Alabama, at nearly twice the national average. Pennsylvania was the leading steel-producing
state, and West Virginia was a leading coal-producing state.
As discussed above, immigrants may have brought positive attitudes towards unions
with them. This is potentially an interesting kind of spillover to look at, but not one that I will
focus on here. In my analysis, I will control for diﬀerences in immigration across locations.
For my immigration measure, I go all the way back to the 1910 Census. Immigration was
11closed in the 1920s. In Table 2, the “foreign” statistic reported is the percentage of the white
population with at least one parent born outside of the United States. Note the dramatic
diﬀerence between the North and South in this measure: 49.1 percent of whites in the North
and only 8.1 percent of whites in the South.
The last row of the table highlights the well-known historical diﬀerences between the
North and South in matters of race. In 1910, 35 percent of the population in the South was
black compared to only 3 percent in the North.
III. The Statistical Model
Now I examine the cross-section relationship between an establishment’s unionization status
in the late 20th century and the degree to which it is located near where mining and metal
establishments existed in the 1950s.
A. Notation
I nt e r m so fn o t a t i o n ,f o ra ne s t a b l i s h m e n te at location  ,l e tsm
  denote unionism spillover
from mining and metal industries at the establishment’s location. Let ue be an indicator
variable, so that ue =1if the establishment is unionized and ue =0if not. I examine the re-
lationship between ue and sm
  , holding ﬁxed various other characteristics of the establishment
and the location.
To deﬁne the spillover, let qm
  be the share of total employment that is in the unionized
mining and metal establishments in the 1950s at location  . The spillover sm
  collected at  
is a weighted average of the spillovers being emitted nearby. Let yk  denote the distance in
miles between location k and location  .L e tN
y
  = {k, yk  ≤ y} be the neighboring locations
















This speciﬁcation weights nearby spillovers being emitted both by population nk as well as
an exponential decay function that declines with distance. It is similar in spirit to a gravity
speciﬁcation in trade models. The parameter δ governs how things decay with distance. The
parameter y governs how far one goes out to collect spillovers. In eﬀect, beyond the distance
y there is inﬁnite decay of the spillover.
Let xe denote a vector of establishment characteristics, e.g., a measure of size or a form
of organization (like proﬁt vs. nonproﬁt). Let z  denote a vector of location   characteristics.
This will include a vector of state ﬁxed eﬀects, to capture diﬀerences across states in labor
market polices and race policies and mean diﬀe r e n c e sa c r o s ss t a t e si nt h i n g sl i k ei m m i g r a t i o n .
12The vector z  also includes location characteristics that potentially vary within a state, like
demographic variables.
I model the decision to unionize in terms of a discrete choice framework. Suppose that





 γ + αs
m
  +  e.( 2 )
The establishment is unionized if ve ≥ 0 and is not if ve < 0. The key parameter here is α,
the coeﬃcient on the unionism spillover variable.
B. Variables
In the FMCS/POS data set, an establishment is unionized, ue =1 , if it has at least one union
contract over the period 1986—2003. In the NLRB/CBP data, an establishment is unionized
if it has at least one NLRB election over the period 1980—1999. I later consider alternative
deﬁnitions.
In the FMCS/POS data set, the establishment characteristics xe a r es i z e( n u m b e ro f
beds and number of beds squared), dummy variables for establishment organization form
(nonproﬁt, proﬁt, or government), and a dummy variable for facility type (nursing home or
hospital). There are a few establishments with a missing value for organization form; these
get a separate dummy variable. In the NLRB/CBP data set, there are two characteristics:
employment size (with three size categories) and industry. Summary statistics are provided
in a table in the appendix.
Location   is deﬁned at the level of the county. The location characteristics z  at the
county level are population density (population in the year 2000 divided by land area), share
of whites in 1910 with at least one foreign-born parent, and the black population share in
1910.
Recall that qm
  is deﬁned to be the share of total employment in the 1950s in unionized
mining and metal establishments at location  . As discussed earlier, at that time virtually
the entire mining and metal industries were unionized. So I assume here that they are both
all union, and I use the share of employment in 1958 in county   to approximate qm
  .
I consider two alternative speciﬁcations for the spillover function (??). In the 30-
mile-spillover speciﬁcation, I assume that the decay δ =0and the distance y =3 0 .T h e
assumption of δ =0makes things easy to estimate. In the continuous decay speciﬁcation,I
free up δ and impose that y =7 5 .
C. Estimates
Table 3 reports the estimates of the statistical model with the FMCS/POS data on health
care facilities. The ﬁrst three columns of ﬁgures are based on the data from the South, the
13main focus of the paper. For comparison purposes, the last three columns report estimates
for the remaining contiguous United States. Table 6 below considers additional geographic
groupings.
Using the data from the South, the estimate of α in the 30-mile case is 13.5 and
the standard error is 2.5. To estimate standard errors, I cluster observations by county,
using the robust estimator of variance. (This makes a diﬀerence–without clustering, the
standard error is 2.0.) I discuss the magnitude of α further below. Here I just note that
if the probability of unionization is very small, as is the case here, then the probability is
approximately proportionate to eαsm
.S oa tα =1 3 .6, an increase from spillover sm =0to
sm =0 .1 is associated with a multiplicative increase in probability on the order of e1.36 =3 .9
times.
For the continuous decay speciﬁcation and the South data, the estimate of α is 31.3
and spillovers decay at a rate of 1.5 percent per mile. It is not surprising that the spillover
coeﬃcient α is larger in the continuous decay speciﬁcation. If there is decay, then treating
all spillovers within a 30-mile radius the same is a kind of measurement error.
The estimates for α using the data from the rest of the contiguous United States are
about half of what they are for the South. This ﬁnding is likely related to the fact that this
model is nonlinear and that unionization rates are much higher outside the South. So a given
proportionate increase outside the South is a much bigger increase in levels. To explore this
issue further, I report estimates of the linear probability model for both regions. With this
speciﬁcation, the estimated coeﬃcient on sm is actually larger outside the South than in the
South. So a given change in sm outside the South is associated with a bigger change in level,
but a smaller change in percentage terms, outside the South as compared to the South.
T h em a i nc o n c l u s i o nt od r a wf r o mT a b l e3i st h a to v e rs e v e r a ls p e c i ﬁcations and
two geographic populations of establishments, there is a strong positive correlation between
unionization of health care establishments and proximity to mining and metal industries in
the 1950s.
It is worth noting that the probability of unionization depends upon other variables as
well. The model is estimated with state-level ﬁxed eﬀects (not reported) that are important
quantitatively. Examination of the coeﬃcients in Table 3 yields the following conclusions:
In the South, unionization is positively correlated with locations being historically black.
Outside the South, it is correlated with locations with large immigrant populations in the
early 20th century. In the South, hospitals are less likely to be unionized compared to nursing
homes. Outside the South, this is reversed.
Table 4 reports the estimates for the NLRB/CBP data in other industries in the South.
For the sake of comparison, I also include the 30-mile spillover estimates for the FMCS/POS
data. I report only the coeﬃcients on the spillover variables, but all of these estimates
14include establishment characteristics and location characteristics in addition to state ﬁxed
eﬀects. For nursing homes and hospitals, the 30-mile spillover coeﬃcient α estimate from the
NLRB/CBP data is 10.5, which is fairly close to the estimate of 13.5 from the FMCS/POS
data. When I group the remaining four industries in the NLRB/CBP data, the estimated
spillover coeﬃcient is 5.1. Examining each industry individually, I ﬁnd that both retail
groceries and construction have coeﬃcients of 5.1, and both are statistically signiﬁcant. For
wholesale groceries and hotels, there are relatively few observations, and the standard errors
are high.
Table 5 provides information about magnitudes. The ﬁrst column of ﬁgures takes the
ﬁtted probability of an establishment being unionized from the model with a 30-mile spillover.
For the FMCS/POS data (the ﬁrst estimate in Table 4), I report the predicted probability by
state in the South. The second column of ﬁgures re-evaluates the ﬁtted probabilities, setting
the spillover sm =0 .065, which is the average mining and metal share for all of Pennsylvania
in Table 2. The last column sets sm =0 .149, the average share in West Virginia. With the
Pennsylvania level of spillover, the ﬁtted probabilities on average double, from 3.2 to 6.2,
and with the West Virginia level, they more than triple. In the estimates with the NLRB
data, for nursing homes and hospitals, the results are quantitatively the same, a doubling
with Pennsylvania’s level and a tripling with West Virginia’s. For the other industries in
the NLRB data, the relationship is more like a 50 percent increase with Pennsylvania and a
doubling with West Virginia.
Note that the exercise in Table 5 is intended merely to give a sense of the magnitude
of the empirical relationship. It is not an estimate of a treatment eﬀect, or prediction, of
what would have happened to say, South Carolina, if it had had the same geology and coal
ﬁelds as West Virginia. If this had been true, other things would have been diﬀe r e n tt h a ta r e
being held ﬁxed in the model. For example, the exercise in Table 5 holds ﬁxed the state-level
ﬁxed eﬀect. If South Carolina had coal like West Virginia, it is likely it would have had
a base of powerful mine and steel worker unions that could have potentially blocked anti-
union laws, such as the right-to-work laws that were passed in South Carolina. With such a
treatment, it might very well be that the resulting unionization rate in South Carolina would
be higher than the ﬁtted value of 10.6 percent in Table 5. While the parameter estimates
are not structural, they do provide strong evidence that geographic spillover takes place. If
spillovers didn’t occur, I would expect no empirical connection between unionization rates
and proximity to mining and metal, given all of the controls that I have included.
Table 6 looks at the robustness of these results. The top row contains the 30-mile
spillover model’s estimates for the three data groups: nursing homes and hospitals in the
FMCS/POS and NLRB/CBP data and the other industries in the NLRB/CBP data (from
Table 4). The next row adds three location-level variables that have been suggested by sem-
15inar participants: per capita income (2000 per capita income of the establishment’s county),
a political variable (the share voting Democratic in the 1988 presidential election), and de-
mographic information more recent than 1910. (I use the black share for 2000, which in the
South is highly collinear with the 1910 black share.) Adding these variables makes virtually
no diﬀerence in the estimate of the spillover coeﬃcient. The second change is to eliminate
all right-side variables besides the spillover and the state ﬁxed eﬀects, and the third is to
get rid of state ﬁxed eﬀects as well. With these changes, the estimates decrease from the
original somewhat, but remain large. The fourth change keeps the right side the same as
the original but uses a stricter deﬁnition for classifying an establishment as unionized. For
the FMCS/POS data, I now require that an establishment have at least four contracts while
before I required only one. For the NLRB data, I now require an establishment to have
at least one election in which the union won while before I required only that it have an
election. These further restrictions reduce the number of establishments classiﬁed as union
on the order of one-half. But for the FMCS/POS data, there is virtually no change in the
spillover estimates. For the NLRB/CBP data, the coeﬃcient increases slightly.
The next set of robustness exercises maintains the baseline speciﬁcation but changes
the geographic areas. Some scholars, such as Marshall (1967), use a broader deﬁnition of the
South that includes West Virginia, Kentucky, and Oklahoma. Adding these states lowers the
coeﬃcients, but the magnitude of the relationship remains large. The next geographic area
is the North, as deﬁned earlier. The coeﬃcients are approximately half as they are for the
baseline estimates for the South. So in percent terms, the eﬀect is approximately one-half.
But the base probabilities in the North are on the order of twice as high, so the eﬀects in
the North are comparable in level terms with the South. The next region is the Mountain
and Plains States, the 14-state region between the Paciﬁc States (California, Oregon, and
Washington) and the North and South. This region, including states like Montana, Colorado,
New Mexico, and Arizona, has signiﬁcant mining activity in some places and so is a natural
area to focus on. For this region and for the FMCS/POS data, the estimate of α is 8.3 and
the standard error is 1.5, which are remarkably similar to the estimates for the other regions.
There is a diﬀerence with the estimates using the NLRB data as the coeﬃcients are close to
zero. This area is an anomaly in that elsewhere, for the health care sector, the coeﬃcient
obtained with the FMCS/POS contract data is similar to the coeﬃcient obtained with the
NLRB/CBP data. I don’t have an explanation for the diﬀerence. But I put more weight
on the FMCS/POS data, both because the data are cleaner and more reliable and because
conceptually I prefer a unionization measure in levels (i.e., existing contracts) rather than
in election rates. The ﬁnal region considered is the PaciﬁcS t a t e s . T h e r ei sl i t t l ei nt h e
way of mining or metal industries to speak of in this area and little variation in spillover
for identifying the relationship. (See summary statistics in Table A2.) Unsurprisingly, the
16standard errors are quite high, in the range of 5 to 7, for this region. The exercise of
this paper is not interesting to consider for these states. The last row in Table 6 reports
the coeﬃcients when the data for all contiguous United States are pooled together. The
bottom line is that, particularly for the FMCS/POS contract data for health care facilities,
the relationship between unionization and spillover is strong throughout United States, not
just in the South.
The ﬁnal data exercise broaches the issue of the channels through which spillovers take
place. As discussed earlier, one channel is union infrastructure and staﬀ.U n i o n se m p l o ys t a ﬀ
people who are on the lookout for new organizing activities. Naturally, a union staﬀ person
will be mainly interested in expanding his or her own union. That is, a staﬀ person for the
USWA will be working to organize new USWA establishments. A staﬀ person for the United
Mine Workers (UMW) will be organizing for the UMW. To the extent that spillovers work
through an infrastructure channel, we should see as a necessary condition that health care
facilities and grocery stores near mining and metal establishments should be organized by
the UMW or the USWA. If we see health care facilities near coal mines represented by the
service workers union, the spillover can’t all be infrastructure.
To examine this issue, I use the information about union aﬃliation available in the
data. I consider what happens when I exclude representation by the USWA and the UMW.
Speciﬁcally, all establishments in the FMCS/POS data that have a labor contract with the
UMW or USWA or establishments in the NLRB/CBP data that have an election involving
one of those unions are classiﬁed as nonunion. So only those establishments unconnected
t ot h eU M Wo rt h eU S W Aa n dh a v i n gs o m eo t h e ru n i o na ﬃliation are now classiﬁed as
union. In this case, as reported in Table 7, the spillover coeﬃcients for nursing homes and
hospitals fall by 30—45 percent, for the two data sets. The coeﬃcient falls for the other
industries as well, though by a much smaller amount. These declines are consistent with
union infrastructure being a factor. But the results also imply that union infrastructure is
n o tt h ew h o l es t o r y .M o r et h a nh a l fo ft h ec o e ﬃcient remains when we reclassify the UMW
and USWA observations. This result is being driven by nursing homes and grocery stores
with aﬃliations like the Service Workers (SEIU) and Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW)
unions near mines and metal plants that are diﬀerent from the aﬃliations that have organized
the mines and factories.
The ﬁnal row in Table 7 goes the other way and classiﬁes as union only those estab-
lishments with a UMW or USWA contract. This increases all the coeﬃcients compared to
the original model estimates, especially so for the other industries in the NLRB/CBP, where
the coeﬃcient more than triples. It is clear that the USWA and UMW are getting out of
steel mills and coal mines into neighboring establishments.
17IV. A Visual Presentation of the Data
The previous section uses statistics to summarize the data. This section provides a visual
presentation of the raw data. The results parallel the statistical ﬁndings.
The majority of mining and metal activity in 1958 was concentrated in the 15-state
region illustrated in Figure 1. The region accounted for 70 percent of all coal and metal
mining employment and 57 percent of primary metal manufacturing. And, again, virtually
all of these establishments were unionized. Figure 1(a) is a map of the location in 1958 of
establishments in these industries with 100 or more employees; each dot represents one plant.15
Consider the point labeled A in Pennsylvania in Figure 1(a). (State names are provided in the
bottom right map.) Just below point A is the area around Pittsburgh, which has the heaviest
concentration of the mining and metal industries. Next consider point B in Alabama. This
is the Birmingham area. This is also a major center of mining and metal manufacturing.
Looking between these two points, we see signiﬁcant mining and metal activity, particularly
in West Virginia and eastern Kentucky. This area follows the Appalachian Mountains and is
rich in coal seams.
Figure 1(b) plots the locations of the health care facilities in the 1996 POS data that
I have classiﬁed as unionized based on the FMCS/POS data. The extent to which current
unionism in the health care sector follows the distribution of mining and metal activity from
the 1950s is remarkable. Note, in particular, the heavy concentration of unionized facilities
in West Virginia and eastern Kentucky and in Alabama around Birmingham, all areas where
mining and metal activities are concentrated.
The remaining two maps restrict attention to establishments aﬃliated with the USWA.
Figure 2(a) illustrates the location of health care facilities in the FMCS/POS data in the
region with at least one USWA contract. There are 54 such facilities in the region. The areas
where the USWA gets into health care facilities are all areas where there is a large base of
mines and steel mills. Figure 2(b) is based on information from the USWA Web site on the
location of grocery stores and beverage distributors that are represented by the USWA. (See
data appendix.) The same pattern holds here.
V. Concluding Remarks
This study shows that while unionism in health care facilities and grocery stores is weak in
the South overall, those facilities situated near coal mines and steel mills have unionization
rates closer to their counterparts in the North. How does unionism spill out of mines and
into grocery stores? This study suggests two answers. One is union infrastructure. This is
15T h el o c a t i o ni n f o r m a t i o ni nt h em a pi sa c c u r a t et ot h el e v e lo ft h ec o u n t y .
18consistent with the fact that some of the health care facilities near mines and steel mills are
organized by the USWA. The second answer is that the workers themselves are bringing
in the seeds of unionism they have picked up from their own experience in mines or mills
or from the experiences of their families and friends. This is consistent with the fact that
most health care facilities near mines and mills are organized by unions unrelated to those
organizing mines and mills.
It is well-appreciated that the massive decline of heavy industry employment in the
United States has had a direct eﬀect in decimating the number of unionized workers in this
country. The results presented here suggest that there is a secondary eﬀe c tt h a tg o e sb e y o n d
those industries. The reduction in geographic spillovers from heavy industry can be expected
to also negatively impact unionism in other sectors, like health care and retail trade.
An example can make this more concrete. In 1958, Jeﬀerson County, Alabama, where
Birmingham is located, had 30,000 workers in steel mills and coal mines accounting for
14 percent of all employment. As of 2002, this number had fallen to only 9,000 workers,
accounting for just 2.5 percent of all employment. Spillovers have been vastly diluted. Lately,
several new auto plants have been built in the Birmingham area, and the United Auto Workers
has so far been unsuccessful in organizing them. If new auto plants in the Birmingham area
can resist unionization, there is little chance that the new nonunion entrants to the grocery
business in the area, like Wal-Mart, will ever be unionized.
19Data Appendix
Here I describe in more detail the data I collected from various sources to get more geograph-
ical detail on unionism in the United States. Data and sample programs for the paper are
posted at www.econ.umn.edu/~holmes/data/geo_spill. Summary statistics are presented in
Tables A1 and A2.
A. FMCS/POS
I obtained the POS ﬁles from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). I se-
lected all nursing homes and hospitals in the POS ﬁle from 1996. Nursing homes included
establishments in the following categories: skilled nursing facilities (SNF), nursing facilities
(NF), SNF/NF dually, and SNF/NF distinct. This resulted in 21,920 establishments, exclud-
ing any in Alaska and Hawaii.
I obtained the data on expired contracts from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service (FMCS). I took the subset of FMCS contracts designated as from the “health care”
industry and matched them to the POS universe. For the purpose of matching, I included
the 1991 and 2001 POS ﬁl e sa sw e l la st h e1 9 9 6ﬁle. I used the address, phone numbers, and
company name information in the FMCS and POS ﬁle for matching. The computer did most
of the work here, but there was also an extensive amount of manual matching. As discussed
in the text, I made frequent use of Google to complete a match. In some cases, I would be
able to determine that the FMCS entity was actually a retirement home or a mental health
facility and therefore not part of my underlying universe. In other cases, I would be able to
obtain additional information about the facility that would enable me to complete the match
to the POS ﬁle. I was able to match 96.4 percent of the 27,629 health care facility contracts
in the FMCS data base.
In New York and Minnesota, there are industry-wide contracts that are negotiated by
a consortia of health care providers. In a majority of such cases, I was able to obtain the
actual contract from the U.S. Department of Labor and other sources in order to determine
the facilities covered from the contract language. There were several important multi-facility
contracts that could not be matched this way, particularly the complex set of contracts for
the Kaiser health system, a system of hospitals on the West Coast that is essentially all union.
For such cases, I went to the Web sites of the local unions negotiating the contracts, where
I usually found lists of the covered facilities. Of the 560 facilities listed on union Web sites
as represented, in 88 percent of the cases I already had one or more matching contracts for
the facility in the FMCS data base. I take this as evidence that the matched data are very
reliable.
In determining whether a facility was represented, I excluded in the FMCS data notices
of bargaining for ﬁrst contracts. I used only expiration notices of contracts that have actually
20been obtained.16
B. NLRB/CBP
I put together NLRB election data for 1980—1999, which I obtained from various sources:
Bruce Fallick (Fallick and Hassett 1999), Henry Farber (1984, 2001), the NLRB, and the
National Archives. I selected elections from the following six SIC industry codes: 15, contract
construction; 5140, wholesale groceries and related products; 5410, grocery stores; 7010,
hotels and motels; 8050, nursing and personal care facilities; and 8060, hospitals. Excluding
Alaska and Hawaii, this resulted in 13,859 elections.
I then matched elections by address and employer name and identiﬁed 11,098 unique
establishments. I then set establishment size equal to twice the eligible number of votes in
an election. Using the industry, county, and size information in the NLRB data, I matched
the 11,098 establishments to the CBP data. I aggregated size classes in the CBP data to
three employment size groups: 1—49, 50—249, and 250 and more. In a few cases, there was
not an establishment in a given size category in a given industry and county, and in such
cases, I assigned the NLRB establishment to a larger CBP establishment or, if none, to a
smaller CBP establishment. There were only 87 NLRB establishments for which I could not
ﬁnd a corresponding establishment in the 1992 CBP in the same industry and county, and I
eliminated them.
C. Other Variables
As discussed in the text, data on mining and metal employment were obtained from the U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1961a, b). For the primary metal industries (SIC 33), the establishment
employment size data have seven categories: 1—19, 20—49, 50—99, 100—249, 250—499, 500—999,
and 1,000 and more. I set the employment of each establishment equal to the mean of its
size group. For the mining industries (SIC 10, 11, 12), the employment size groupings in
the tables are more aggregated: 0—19, 20—99, 100—249, and 250 and more. However, there is
additional information in the Census publication in the form of county maps of employment
that permitted me to break up the 250 and more category to 250—999 and 1,000 and above.
County demographic data from 1910 were obtained from a 1970s study of the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR, 197?, 1988). Use of these
data required various cleanings. I went back to the original Census tabulations to ﬁxs o m e
mistakes and to ﬁll in left out observations like those of the District of Columbia.
16When workers vote for a union in an NLRB election, the ﬁrm is required to recognize the union and
bargain for a year. But in a large percentage of cases, the union never gets a ﬁrst contract. (See Cooke
1985.) I exclude notices of ﬁrst bargaining by eliminating records with blank values for contract expiration
and reopen dates. Beginning in 2003, the FMCS added an explicit categorical variable that distinguishes
notices of ﬁrst bargaining. Using this new ﬁeld, I have determined that my approach of identifying notices
of initial bargaining is very accurate.
21Data on demographic information for 2000 and on per capita income were obtained
from the 2000 Census. Data for the 1988 presidential election were obtained from a 1988
ICPSR study. The ﬁgure reported is the Democratic share of the combined vote for the
Democratic and Republican candidates.
The data for Figure 2(b), the location of retail food and wholesale beverage distribution
establishments represented by the USWA, were obtained directly from the USWA Web site on
5/24/2001. This information is no longer posted there, so I have posted this noncopyrighted
information at my Web site, along with the rest of the data at my Web site.
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24Table 1 
Unionization Rates by Industry and Geographic Area 
 
           Selected States 
     Regions    Least Unionized    Highly Unionized 
Data Set 
All   South North 
Rest of 
U.S.   N.C.  S.C.  Ala.  W.Va.  Penn. 
CPS (1999–2001) 
Rates per 100 workers 
                  
  All Industries (including public sector)  14.9    7.7 19.5 15.3    4.2 5.0    11.3 15.9 18.3 
Nontraded Industries with Significant 
Unionization 
                  
  Nursing and Personal Care Facilities  10.8    1.9 16.0  6.5    1.9 .0    3.4 8.3  17.7 
 Hospitals  15.3    4.7 19.2 20.0    2.7 3.4    5.0 8.0  15.2 
 Wholesale  Trade:  Groceries  12.9    4.6 18.5 13.3    1.1 .0    11.7 23.1 23.6 
 Retail  Trade:  Groceries  21.3    5.8 26.7 31.8    1.2 .0    9.1 11.8 17.3 
 Hotels  and  Motels  10.6    2.5 13.1 14.7    .0 .0    .0 .0  6.9 
 Construction  20.4    6.7 32.1 19.8    2.5 4.3    10.3 23.9 28.9 
 
FMCS/POS 
Rates per 100 establishments 
                  
 Nursing  Homes  20.2    4.8 31.8 10.9    1.6 1.9    10.5 35.6 32.3 
 Hospitals  26.0    3.4 38.5 30.4    4.6 2.4    1.9 12.2 41.2 
 
NLRB/CBP 
Rates per 1,000 establishments 
                  
  Nursing and Personal Care Facilities  120.8    54.5 180.4  68.5   20.5 50.5    81.8 350.6 195.7 
 Hospitals  210.6    27.5 324.7 230.2   17.6 37.0    36.4 246.6 384.2 
 Wholesale  Trade:  Groceries  27.8    16.7 32.1 30.8    18.0 10.7    25.7 42.3 28.9 
 Retail  Trade:  Groceries  7.2    2.3 7.3  14.8    .6 1.2    2.4 10.7  8.6 
 Hotels  and  Motels  18.9    6.7 28.2 19.3    3.1 3.4    2.1 21.9 42.6 
 Construction  7.0    4.3 8.1 7.9    .7 .7    4.8 9.4  10.1 
 
  CPS = Results of Current Population Survey averaged over 1999–2001. 
  FMCS/POS =  Combination of data on health care facilities from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the “Provider of Services” file of the Centers for  
  Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
  NLRB/CBP =  Combination of data on establishments from the National Labor Relations Board (data on union representation elections) and the U.S. Census Bureau’s  





Sources of Spillovers 
Size and Location of Highly Unionized Industries 
and Related Population Characteristics 
in Selected Geographic Areas of the United States 
in the 20th Century 
 
     Regions    Selected  States 
Category All    South North  Rest of 
U.S.    N.C. S.C.  Ala. W.Va.  Penn. 
Industry Employment 
Shares in 1958 
               
    Mining  .5    .2 .6 .4    .0 .0 .9  11.1  1.5 
    Metal Manufacturing  1.7    .7 2.4  .8    .2  .1 4.0 3.8 5.0 
    Mining + Metal Manufacturing  2.2    1.0 3.0 1.2    .2  .1 4.9  14.9 6.5 
                
Population Shares in 1910                 
    White Population  with Foreign-  
 Born  Parent 
37.5    8.1 49.1 40.0    1.1 3.5 4.3  10.8  43.4 
    Black Population  10.7    35.2 3.0 1.8    32.5 54.7 42.7  4.9  2.6 
 
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
 
 Tables 3–4 
Estimating the Correlation Between 
Unionization and Proximity to the 
U.S. Mining and Metal Manufacturing Industries 
in the 1950s 
 
Table 3 
In Health Care Facilities in Two Geographic Areas 
Using the FMCS/POS Data and Three Model Specifications 
(Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.) 
 













Spillover             
    Spillover Coefficient α  13.6 31.3  .595   6.6 9.8  .837 
  (2.4) (4.6)  (.215)    (1.0)  (2.0) (.147) 
             
    Decay Rate  δ*100 (% per mile)  — 1.4  —    — 4.5  — 
   (.6)       (1.9)   
             
County Variables              
    Population Share in 1910              
        Black  3.4  4.0  .084    1.5 1.8  .062 
  (.7) (.6)  (.022)    (1.7)  (1.6)  (.122) 
        White with Foreign-Born   .4  .4  .005    2.8 2.7  .389 
 Parent  (.9) (.9)  (.017)    (.4)  (.4)  (.064) 
    Population Density (2000)  .1  .2  .001    .06 .1  .009 
  (.1) (.1)  (.004)    (.03)  (.0)  (.003) 
Establishment Characteristics              
    Log Beds  1.1  1.1  −.028    1.7 1.7  .069 
  (1.2) (1.1)  (.020)    (.5)  (.5) (.035) 
    (Log Beds)
2  −.0  −.0  .005    −.1  −.1  .001 
  (.1) (.1)  (.002)    (.0)  (.0)  (.004) 
    For-Profit Dummy  .2  .2  .006    .1 .1  .018 
  (.2) (.2)  (.004)    (.1)  (.1)  (.014) 
    Government Dummy  −1.4  −1.4  −.010    −.2  −.2  −.031 
  (.5) (.5)  (.007)    (.1)  (.1)  (.013) 
    Type-Missing Dummy  −1.2  −1.2  −.013    −1.9  −1.9  −.210 
  (.9) (.9)  (.009)    (.2)  (.2)  (.020) 
    Hospital Dummy  −1.0  −1.1  −.022    .6 .6  .089 
  (.3) (.3)  (.009)    (.1)  (.1)  (.011) 
             
Number of Establishments  6,194  6,194  6,194    15,561 15,561  15,561 
 
*All specifications include state-level fixed effects that aren’t reported. Table 4 
In Other Industries in the South 
Using the NLRB/CBP Data and Two Model Specifications 
(Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.) 
 
  Value for Each 
Specification and Statistic 







Data Set and Industry  α    α  δ*100   Establishments Unionized 
FMCS/POS              








  6,194 199 
            
NLRB/CBP            









  7,557 357 









  228,026 1,048 
                










  10,583 177 









  47,536 110 









  12,198 84 








  157,344 677 
 
*For this case, the estimate of δ was at the lower bound of zero. Table 5 
The Magnitude of the Fitted Empirical Relationship 
Mean Fitted Probability of an Establishment Being Unionized 
in Various Southern States and Industries, 
at Alternative Spillover Levels, Using Estimates from 30-Mile Spillover Model 
 
  Fitted Probability with Spillover of 
Geographic Area and Industry  Actual  Pennsylvania 
West 
Virginia 
By State       
FMCS/POS Health Care Facilities 
(per 100 establishments)       
 Alabama  6.1  6.6  16.5 
 Arkansas  4.2  8.5  20.3 
 Florida  7.6  15.6  34.8 
 Georgia  1.7  3.9  10.6 
 Louisiana  2.4  5.3  14.0 
 Mississippi  4.2  8.7  20.3 
 North  Carolina  1.4  3.2  9.0 
 South  Carolina  1.7  3.9  10.6 
 Tennessee  3.9  7.5  18.3 
 Texas  1.1  2.0  5.8 
 Virginia  3.3  5.3  14.0 
 
All of the South       
FMCS/POS Health Care Facilities 
(per 100 establishments)  3.2  6.2  15.1 
      
NLRB/CBP Industries 
(per 1,000 establishments)       
  Nursing Homes and Hospitals  47.2  79.0  159.6 
 Other  Nontraded  Industries  4.6  6.0  9.1 
    Wholesale Trade: Groceries  16.7  17.6  19.1 
    Retail Trade: Groceries  2.3  3.0  4.6 
    Hotels and Motels  6.9  8.8  12.3 
   Construction  4.3  5.7  8.5 
 Table 6 
Robustness of the Model’s Spillover Coefficient Estimates 
Model’s Estimates of Spillover Coefficients with Proposed Model Changes 
and with Alternative Data Sets and Industries 
(Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.) 
 
 
Value with  
Specified Data Set and Industries 

















Model with Changes        



































Alternative Geographic Areas        
  Expand South to include W. Va., Ky., and Okla.  9.6 
(1.4) 
 




 North  7.0 
(1.2) 
 




  Mountain and Plains States  8.3 
(1.5) 
 





  Pacific States (Calif., Ore., and Wash.)  −4.9 
(6.9) 
 




  All of Contiguous United States  7.5 
(1.0) 
 







Examining a Potential Channel of Spillover: 
Affiliation with Mining and Metal Manufacturing Unions 
Model’s Estimates of Spillover Coefficients with the Classification of Establishments 
as Unionized Linked to Their Affiliation with Either of Two Large Unions: 
United Mine Workers or United Steelworkers of America 
(Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.) 
 
 
Value with  
Specified Data Set and Industries 

















Model with Change in Definition of Union Status        


















 Appendix Table A1 
Detailed Summary Statistics for Establishments in South 
 
  Value with Alternative Data Sets and Industries 






















Union .03  .18    .05 .21    .005 .07 
              
Establishment Size               
 Beds    136.03  154.20           
 Employment  1–49  —      .34 .47    .948 .22 
   50–249  —      .51 .50    .049 .22 
   250+  —      .14 .35    .004 .06 
              
Establishment  
Organization Form     
 
  
    
 Nonprofit  .21  .40           
 For-Profit  .64  .48           
 Government  .12  .33           
 Type  Missing  .04  .19           
              
Industry              
 Nursing  Homes  .64  .48    .73 .44      
 Hospitals  .36  .48    .27 .44      
  Wholesale Trade: Groceries  —  —         .05 .21 
  Retail Trade: Groceries  —  —         .21 .41 
  Hotels and Motels  —  —         .06 .23 
 Construction  —  —         .69 .46 
              
Population Share 1910               
 White  Foreign  .12  .15    .13 .15    .13 .15 
 Black  Share  .30  .19    .31 .18    .32 .17 
              
Population Density (2000)  .55  .85    .66 .89    .72 .89 
              
Neighboring Mining/Metal 
Share .01  .03 
 
.01 .03 




              
Number of Establishments  6,194      7,557     228,026  
 Appendix Table A2 
Selected Summary Statistics by Region 
 
  Value with Alternative Data Sets and Industries 








   
Other Nontraded 
Industries 











South              
 Union  .032  .176    .047 .212    .005 .068 
  Neig. Mine/Metal Share   .009  .027    .008 .026    .008 .024 
  Number of Establishments  6,194    7,557    228,026 
              
North              
 Union  .261  .439    .212 .409    .010 .100 
  Neig. Mine/Metal Share   .030  .042    .030 .041    .027 .037 
  Number of Establishments  10,003    13,522    362,470 
              
Mountain and Plains States               
 Union  .041  .198    .066 .249    .012 .110 
  Neig. Mine/Metal Share   .012  .042    .015 .042    .021 .052 
  Number of Establishments  3,231    3,603    89,067 
              
Pacific States (Calif., Ore., Wash.)               
 Union  .263  .449    .162 .368    .010 .098 
  Neig. Mine/Metal Share   .009  .009    .009 .009    .009 .009 
  Number of Establishments  2,327    3,263    123,729 
              
Contiguous United States               
 Union  .163  .370    .143 .350    .009 .093 
  Neig. Mine/Metal Share   .019  .037    .019 .037    .018 .034 
  Number of Establishments  21,755    27,946    803,292 
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